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CRIMINAL LAW - INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION -
Federal Child Pornography Statute Applies to Extraterri-
torial Acts, United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th
Cir. 1990).
The Federal Child Pornography Statute, popularly known
as the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act
("Act"), imposes criminal sanctions against persons using,
employing, or otherwise enticing any minor to engage in sexu-
ally explicit conduct for the production of a visual depiction of
the conduct.' The Act, however, does not expressly state
whether it penalizes illegal conduct if committed by United
States nationals outside the United States' territories.2 In
United States v. Thomas,3 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found that Congress intended to reach
extraterritorial conduct and held that a United States national
could be convicted of violating the Act whether or not the
illegal conduct took place in the United States.4
In December, 1986, a film developing company received
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1988). Chapter 110 of Title 18 is entitled "Sexual Exploita-
tion of Children." Id. The statute was first referred to as the Protection of Chil-
dren Against Sexual Exploitation. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (1978). The statute's short
titles changed with each of its three subsequent amendments. 18 U.S.C. § 2251
(Supp. 1989). The first set of amendments created The Child Protection Act of
1984. Id. The second set of amendments was entitled The Child Abuse Victims'
Rights Act of 1986, and also in 1986, The Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography
Act of 1986. Id. The statute as finally enacted was called the Child Protection and
Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988. Id. The section of the pornography statutes
held to apply to extraterritorial acts reads in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in,
or who transports any minor in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor
engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any vis-
ual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection
(d), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will
be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, or if such visual
depiction has actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or
mailed.
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. 1989).
2. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (text of section 2251 (a)); infra note 8
and accompanying text (text of section 2252).
3. United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1990).
4. 893 F.2d at 1069.
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several rolls of film by mail from Charles J. Thomas
("Thomas").- After developing the film, the company discov-
ered that the film contained images of a girl, approximately
thirteen years old, engaged in sexual acts with an adult male,
later identified as Thomas.6 The film developing company
surrendered the film to the United States Postal Service,
which arrested Thomas when he retrieved the film from the
post office.7
Thomas was prosecuted under the Child Pornography stat-
utes and was charged with engaging a minor in sexually ex-
plicit conduct for the purpose of creating a visual depiction.'
Thomas was convicted under the Act by a jury in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California. 9
Thomas appealed the conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.'" On appeal, Thomas argued
that the conviction under the Act must be reversed on the
5. 893 F.2d at 1067. Clark Color Laboratories received the rolls of film in an
envelope with a San Ysidro, California address. Id.
6. 893 F.2d at 1067. Not only was Thomas readily identifiable as the adult male
in the pictures, but the pictures developed also included pictures of Thomas' wife
and a blanket possessed by Thomas. Id.
7. 893 F.2d at 1067. The Postal Service conducted a controlled delivery of the
film. Id. The post office box to which the controlled delivery was made was regis-
tered to Thomas. Id.
8. 893 F.2d at 1068. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (citing exact lan-
guage under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a)). Thomas was also indicted and convicted for
transporting and receiving obscene material. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp.
1989) (transporting violates section 2252(a)(1) and receiving violates section
2252(a)(2)). The sections state in relevant part:
(a) any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes any visual depiction that has been trans-
ported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce by any means including
computer or mails or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for interstate
or foreign commerce by means of computer or mails, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor en-
gaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such depiction is of such conduct ....
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. 1989).
9. 893 F.2d at 1068.
10. Id.
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basis that the alleged acts were committed in Mexico, and the
Act does not apply to extraterritorial conduct. 1
In 1977, Congress enacted the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act, a child pornography statute
prohibiting the use of children in sexually explicit visual
materials."2 By making the sexual exploitation of minors ille-
gal, Congress hoped to reduce the abuse of children inherent
in the production of prurient material. 3 The Act, however, is
11. 893 F.2d at 1068. See supra note I and accompanying text (statutory lan-
guage in section 2251 (a)).
12. See supra notes I and 9 and accompanying text (subsequent amendments
and statutory language). The subsequent amendments refining the act eliminated
the "commercial purpose" requirement and amended the "Mann Act" to include
minor males as well as females. See H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 493, 494 (harm exists
whether or not there is profit); H.R. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5952 (closing loophole to cover trans-
portation of children for purpose of child pornography even absent commercial
purpose). The House report stated:
Persons who use or entice children to engage in sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of creating child pornography do not violate the 18 U.S.C. § 2251
unless their conduct is for pecuniary profit. (Although section 2251 does not
contain express language of a commercial requirement, such a requirement is
imposed by the definition of 'producing' in section 2252(3) which imposes a
'for pecuniary profit' requirement.)
H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 492, 493. All references in the Thomas court's opinion refer to
1986 version of the child pornography statutes. H.R. REP. No. 910, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5952 (no commer-
cial purpose requirement). See S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 41 (legislative purpose to fill voids in
current federal law). Congress' main concern was to address the abuse of children
by attacking the vast profit potential in the production of pornography. Id. at 43.
The need for such federal legislation was based on the following findings:
-Child pornography and child prostitution had become a highly organized,
multimillion dollar industry that operates on nationwide scale.
-The use of children as prostitutes or the subjects of pornographic material is
very harmful to both children and society on the whole.
-Such prostitution and the sale and distribution of such pornographic materi-
als are carried on to a substantial extent through the mails and other instru-
mentalities of interstate and foreign commerce, and
-That existing Federal laws dealing with prostitution and pornography do not
protect against the use of children in these areas and that specific legislation in
both areas is needed.
S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 42-43.
13. See S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 40 (act designed to address child sexual abuse).
608 SUFFOLK TRANSNA TIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:605
silent on the issue as to whether it applies to conduct which
takes place outside the United States.'
4
In the absence of explicit language, legislation of Congress
is construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. 5 If a statute does not explicitly state that it
applies outside the United States territories, extraterritorial
application may be inferred from the nature of the offense and
from congressional intent.16 International law must be con-
Although Congress clearly wanted to eradicate the use of children in pornographic
materials, Congress focused its attack on the nationwide problem of transporting
children between states for the purpose of producing such material. Id. at 42-43.
Congress was so concerned with the interstate transport of children for the purpose
of the production of child pornography that it amended the Mann Act to include
all minor children, both male and female. Id. at 52. Before the 1977 legislation was
enacted, the production of child pornography might have resulted in a federal of-
fense for mailing or importing sexually explicit material. H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th
Cong. 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEws 495.
Child abuse was addressed by state law, but due to the interstate nature of child
pornography, states requested that federal criminal child pornography laws be en-
acted. Id. The Department of Justice, Postal Service, and Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, prior to the enactment of federal child pornography statutes, were
combatting child pornography by enforcing statutes that prohibited the mailing,
importation, and interstate transportation of obscene material. S. REP. No. 438,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 47.
14. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explicit statutory language only
refers to transportation involving minor in foreign commerce). The statute did not
contemplate the violation of the Act outside the United States' Territories, but
rather was directed at the use of minors "in any Territory or Possession of the
United States." Id. Congress was, however, concerned with the fact that some
child pornography found in the states was produced abroad, but, more commonly,
that films made in the United States were sent abroad for reproduction and then
returned to the United States. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 44.
15. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 n.2 (1932) (question of
applicability of legislation to citizens abroad is one of construction). In Blackmer,
the Court held that a United States citizen living abroad is still subject to United
States law. Id. at 438. The Blackmer Court stated that the acts of Congress are
construed by the courts to apply to conduct which takes place outside the United
States unless contrary intent is evidenced. Id. The issue of its application is a ques-
tion of construction, not legislative power. Id.
16. See United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (statute given
extraterritorial application if nature of law permits and intended Congress). The
Baker court found that with no express language in statutes, the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the statute may be inferred from the nature of the offense and Con-
gress' other legislative efforts to eliminate the crimes involved. Id. See also United
States v. Bowman 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (application to specific locality can be
inferred from nature of offense). The Court stated the following analysis for cases
involving a question of statutory construction:
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sidered when giving extraterritorial application to a statute si-
lent on the extent of its jurisdictional power.17 Congress is not
bound to comply with international law when enacting legisla-
tion, but federal courts interpret statutes in a manner that
would not violate international law in order to foster interna-
tional comity."8
The necessary locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of
Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the crime and upon the
territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to pun-
ish crime under the law of nations. Crimes against private individuals or their
property, like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzle-
ment and frauds of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the
community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the government where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them is to
be extended to include those committed outside of the strict territorial juris-
diction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so
will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard .... But the same rule of
interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class,
not logically dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction,
but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own
citizens . .
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). See also supra note 12 and
accompanying text (neither Act nor subsequent amendments specify extraterrito-
rial application). The legislative histories of the child pornography statutes make
no mention of extraterritorial application beyond transporting or receiving films
from abroad for the purpose of inexpensive reproduction. S. REP. No. 438, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 44.
17. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984)
(courts consider international law before giving extraterritorial application).
18. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984)
(courts consider whether international law permits extraterritorial jurisdiction).
See Recent Case, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 292, 298 (1983) (federal courts have required
that to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, must satisfy prerequisites of applicability
under jurisdictional principles). There exist five alternative theories of interna-
tional jurisdiction. United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (lst Cir. 1982). The
"nationality principle" bases jurisdiction on the nationality of the offender, and
allows a nation to assert jurisdiction over its citizens whoever they are. Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1931). See also United States v. King, 552
F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (country can apply
statute to extraterritorial acts of nationals). The "protective principle" bases juris-
diction on a national interest and allows a country to assert jurisdiction over crimi-
nal acts outside its territory that threaten that country's security. United States v.
Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir. 1982) (principles by which a sovereign may
exercise jurisdiction). The "territorial principle" bases jurisdiction on the location
of the offense and allows a sovereign complete jurisdiction within its borders. Re-
cent Case, supra, at 298 n.51 (territorial principle). The "objective territorial prin-
ciple" allows jurisdiction where an offender intentionally causes harmful
consequences within a country, although the act itself may have occurred outside
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Several federal courts have interpreted other statutes silent
with respect to their extraterritorial effect to apply to acts
committed outside the United States.19 The first statute to be
given extensive extraterritorial application was a statute out-
lawing drug trafficking.' Federal courts have also found
other narcotic-interdiction statutes to have extraterritorial ap-
plication.21 The courts have justified the extraterritorial appli-
cation of these statutes by finding either that the nature of the
the state's territory. See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,
66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 787 n.8 (1988) (objective territorial principle). Fourth, the
"universality principle" bases jurisdiction on physical custody of an offender, and
allows states who have such custody to punish without limit certain types of offen-
sive conduct. Recent Case, supra, at 298 n.52 (universality principle). See generally
Randall, supra, at 788 (universal jurisdiction allows any nation to reach extraterri-
torial acts where lack of traditional connection with crime). The universality doc-
trine was historically developed to deal with piracy that interfered with
international trade on the high seas. Id. Finally, the "passive personality princi-
ple" bases jurisdiction on the nationality of the victim and allows the country to
assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts that harm citizens of that country
wherever they are. Recent Case, supra, at 298 n.53 (passive personality principle).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 1986) (juris-
diction under conspiracy and' firearm statutes extends to acts intending to produce
harmful effect in United States); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Max-
well, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (Security Exchange Act intends protec-
tion against fraud whether or not committed in United States); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (Congress did not
intend Sherman Act to punish acts having no consequences in United States);
United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (aliens found
within United States may be prosecuted under territorial principle).
20. See United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1980) (statute pro-
scribing distribution of marijuana given extraterritorial effect under territorial prin-
ciple); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850 (9th Cir. 1976) (conviction of
United States citizen for unlawful distribution of narcotics in Japan justified under
territorial principle). See also United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373
(11 th Cir. 1982) (Coast Guard boarded vessel 300 miles off Florida coast because
within criminal jurisdiction of Drug Abuse Prevention Act); United States v.
Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980) (statute proscribing possession with intent to
distribute given extraterritorial application outside three-mile limit); 21 U.S.C.
§ 959 (Supp. 1989) (Drug Abuse Prevention Act); Recent Case, supra note 18, at
297 (international principles used to stop piracy on high seas and to combat drug
traffic).
21. See United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983) (intent to
distribute on stateless vessels subject to United States criminal law); United States
v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (applying jurisdiction to stateless
vessels outside United States does not violate international law principles); United
States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 1982) (power to extend jurisdiction
over stateless vessel outside United States territorial waters). See also Recent Case,
supra note 18, at 294 (jurisdiction over stateless vessels engaged in narcotic distri-
bution on high seas).
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crime requires such a broad application, or by finding that
Congress intended the statute to have extraterritorial applica-
tion.22 United States v. Thomas is the first case to consider the
extraterritorial reach of the child pornography statutes based
on Congress' statutory scheme to criminalize the exploitation
of children.23
In United States v. Thomas, 4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the question as to
whether the Act applies to extraterritorial conduct.2" The
court first examined whether the extraterritorial application of
the Act would violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.26 Finding no fifth amendment violation, the
court focused on the interpretation of the Act, a statute that is
22. See United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1980) (nature of
enactment determines extraterritorial application). In Baker, the court found a
comprehensive statutory scheme to stop drug use in the United States by exercising
control of importations of illegal drugs from foreign sources. Id. The court found
no reason to differentiate between the importation of the controlled substances and
the crime of possession with intent to distribute; both crimes were part of the same
statutory framework. Id. at 138.
23. 893 F.2d at 1069. See supra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text (statu-
tory purpose and legislative history).
24. 893 F.2d 1066.
25. 893 F.2d 1066. The court also considered several other issues including ex-
traterritorial application of the statute, the sufficiency of the indictment, prior bad
acts under rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the statute of
limitations, and jury instructions. Id. The court held that the purpose of an indict-
ment was to apprise the defendant of the charge against him, so that the defendant
can defend against it. Id. Thomas, however, neither contended that he was una-
ware of the charge, nor that he was unable to prepare an adequate defense. Id. at
1069. The admission of Thomas' previous convictions for sexual molestation of a
young girl did not violate the Federal Rules of Evidence because it was used to
show knowledge that the girl in the photo was a minor. 893 F.2d at 1070. The
court also held that the statute of limitations had not run because evidence of
Thomas' incarceration from 1979 to 1984 could lead a jury to find that the acts
occurred between 1984 and December 1986, within the five-year limit. Id. at 1071.
Finally, the court's instruction that Thomas could be found to have knowingly
transported or mailed pornography if he simply caused material to be mailed was
correct and in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) which states that "whoever will-
fully causes an act to be done ... is punishable as a principal". Id.
26. 893 F.2d at 1068. See United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d
Cir. 1983) (Congress may intend to reach such conduct unless violates due pro-
cess); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972) (Congress expressly prescribe rule to reach conduct outside United
States, courts bound unless violates due process).
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silent on the jurisdictional extent of its application.27
The court found that Congress' intent that the Act have
extraterritorial application could be inferred from the nature
of the offense and from other legislative acts designed to elimi-
nate child pornography.2" The court reasoned that since Con-
gress intended the Act to protect children from sexual
exploitation, the Act should penalize persons exploiting chil-
dren outside the United States when such sexual exploitation
leads to the sale of child pornography in the United States.29
The court further reasoned that by punishing United States
producers of child pornography made outside the United
States, the court would give full effect to Congress' goal of
eradicating sexual exploitation of children.30 Finally, the
court found that international law is not offended by the appli-
cation of the Act to the extraterritorial conduct of United
States citizens.
31
In holding that the Act had extraterritorial application, the
United States v. Thomas court relied heavily on Congress'
statutory scheme to eradicate the sexual exploitation of chil-
dren. 32  The court recognized the principle that, absent any
express statutory language, it should examine the legislative
history of the Act to determine congressional intent in enact-
ing the statute.33 The court, however, failed to examine the
27. 893 F.2d at 1068. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (application of
statute's extraterritorial jurisdiction is question of construction).
28. 893 F.2d at 1068. See United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir.
1980) (absent express intent, extraterritorial application may be given if nature of
offense permits it and Congress so intends). See also supra notes 15 and 16 and
accompanying text (extraterritorial jurisdiction inferred from nature of offense).
29. 893 F.2d at 1069. See supra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text (legisla-
tive history and purposes of Act).
30. 893 F.2d at 1069.
31. 893 F.2d at 1069. See United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (any principle of international jurisdiction
is applicable); supra note 18 and accompanying text (principles of international
jurisdiction).
32. See supra notes 1 and 8 and accompanying text (child pornography statutes
and subsequent amendments). See also S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS, 40-45 (discussion of
voids in federal law and statutes currently used to combat pornography).
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (inferences under which extraterri-
torial application can be construed).
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legislative history which indicated Congress' intent that the
Act have extraterritorial application and relied solely upon
the statutory scheme.34 While the court's holding may reduce
the sexual exploitation of children, the legislative history does
not reveal any congressional intent that the Act have extrater-
ritorial application."
The court's analogy to federal drug-control laws that have
been interpreted to have extraterritorial effect is misplaced.36
Unlike federal drug-control laws that penalize the importation
of controlled substances, child pornography statutes address
the national problem of using children in the production of
sexually explicit materials in the United States.37 Federal
drug-control laws require international application to be effec-
tive because drug trafficking is international in scope, whereas
child pornography can be produced entirely within the United
States.3 The Act, therefore, does not need extraterritorial ap-
plication to be effective.39
While the court correctly found no violation of interna-
tional law in the extraterritorial application of the Act, noth-
ing in the Act indicates that Congress intended the Act to
reach conduct outside the United States.40 The court acted as
legislator rather than interpreter in coming to the conclusion
34. See supra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text (legislative history and
statutory purpose).
35. See supra notes 1 and 12 and accompanying text (legislative histories of stat-
utes); See also S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 40 (need for federal child pornography statute to combat
nationwide spread of pornography).
36. See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text (federal cases where nar-
cotic statutes held to have extraterritorial application).
37. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (cases proscribing distribution and
importation of marijuana).
38. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (analysis for determining extrater-
ritorial application as inferred from nature of crime).
39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (congressional finding that child
pornography nationwide problem).
40. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (principles of international juris-
diction); S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 40 (legislative history bereft of evidence that Act have
extraterritorial application).
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that the Act applied to extraterritorial conduct.4' If Congress
intended the child pornography statutes to reach extraterrito-
rial conduct, Congress, not the court, should amend the act to
reflect such an intent.42
In United States v. Thomas,43 the court's heavy reliance on
Congress' statutory scheme to eradicate sexual exploitation
may achieve a laudable result, but the legislative history gave
no clear indication that Congress intended the Act to reach
extraterritorial conduct.' The court's analogy to federal drug
statutes is weak, and can be clearly distinguished from child
pornography statutes.45 If Congress intended extraterritorial
application, it would have either expressly provided for it in
the Act or amended the Act to reflect such an intent.46
Sandra W. Magliozzi
41. See supra notes 1 and 12 and accompanying text (subsequent amendments
and legislative history).
42. See supra notes 12 and 15-17 and accompanying text (extraterritorial appli-
cation requires express language or clear congressional intent as evidenced by legis-
lative history).
43. 893 F.2d 1066.
44. See supra notes i2 and 13 and accompanying text (legislative history does
not indicate extraterritorial intent)
45. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (cases holding federal drug stat-
utes applicable to extraterritorial conduct).
46. See supra notes I and 12 and accompanying text (statutory language and
subsequent amendments).
